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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Tony Conner (hereinafter Appellant/Petitioner and/or Mr. Conner) appeals
from the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief based on a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel arising from the failure of his attorney to timely
object to the state's expert witness. The post-conviction court held that the
prosecutor had violated its exclusion order by telling its later expert witness about
an earlier expert witness' testimony, and also, that the expert witness had testified
beyond the scope of his disclosure, and thus the court would have sustained the
defense's motion to strike in part had it timely brought the motion. However, the
post-conviction court held that the Petitioner did not suffer prejudice in that even
with the evidence stricken, the result still would have been the same.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The published opinion in this case in the direct appeal, State v. Conner, 161
Idaho 502 (Ct. App. 2016), describes the following facts:
One evening, at approximately 8:50 p.m., Conner called 911 and
reported having found his
father, Otis Conner
("Otis"), dead in the garage of the home they shared. Conner indicated
to the police that he had come home to find that Otis had fallen off a
ten-foot ladder while trying to retrieve items from an attic storage area
and hit his head on the concrete floor or steps. After an initial
investigation, including discussions with Otis's sons, Doug Conner and
Randy Conner, who expressed concern that Otis's death may not have
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been caused by a fall, the police obtained and executed a search
warrant for Conner's residence.
Detectives found stains on the carpet between the dining room and the
living room. When detectives moved an oddly-positioned chair and rug,
the detectives observed two more stains near a heat register.
Subsequent DNA tests showed that Otis's blood was found on a rug in
the laundry room, on the east living room wall, in the carpeting under
the heat register, in a carpet cleaning machine, on the underside of a
chair in the living room, on the living room ceiling, on the garage floor,
on one of the legs of the ladder, and on the claw of a hammer. Forensic
investigators also tested for the presence of blood which was detected on
the windowsill and the baseboard area near the carpet stains as well as
on the kitchen floor, around the kitchen sink, and on the laundry room
floor. The tests indicated "linear impressions" which the investigators
reported as "drag marks." Based on these findings, the State theorized
that Conner hit Otis on the head with a hammer in the living room,
dragged his body to the garage, and staged an accident using the
ladder. Based on discussions with Doug Conner and Randy Conner and
financial records obtained in the course of the investigation, the State
posited that Conner's motive was financial gain. Conner was charged
with first degree murder, grand theft, forgery, and destruction,
alteration, or concealment of evidence.
At trial, Conner testified that in the week prior to Otis's death, Conner
returned home to find Otis cleaning the living room rug with a large
gauze bandage on his head. Otis told Conner he had fallen. Conner
stated he did not see any blood stains because Otis had moved an area
rug over them. Conner testified that the next day he again returned
home to find Otis using a carpet cleaning machine over the rug. There
were two large blood spots on the rug and the heat register was also
bloody. Conner stated that the gauze bandage from the day before had
been replaced with a larger bandage. Conner further testified that Otis
attempted to lift the heat register but could not get his fingers
underneath its edge, so Conner retrieved a hammer from the garage,
pried up the heat register with the claws of the hammer, and rinsed off
the register in the kitchen sink.
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Prior to trial, Conner moved to admit statements allegedly made by
Otis to Kelly Riggs, a family friend, about Otis falling, injuring his
head, and trying to remove the blood stains. Conner argued that Otis's
prior statements were admissible because they fell under the hearsay
exceptions contained within the Idaho Rules of Evidence. The district
court reserved ruling on Conner's motion until trial. At trial, Conner
argued that under I.R.E. 803(3) and (24), the statements allegedly
made by Otis to Riggs should be admitted. In an offer of proof regarding
his proposed testimony, Riggs told the district court that when he
visited Otis a few days before he passed away, Otis had a bandage on
his forehead. Riggs stated that Otis told him he had fallen while getting
up out of his chair, hit his head, laid on the floor for a while, bled on the
carpet, tried unsuccessfully to clean it up, and moved a chair to cover
the blood spot. The district court ruled that Otis's hearsay statements
were not admissible under Rule 803(3) or (24). Riggs was allowed to
testify only as to his visit with Otis and his observation that Otis had a
bandage on his forehead. Riggs' wife also testified that she had seen a
bandage on Otis's head during the same visit, albeit a smaller-type
bandage than Riggs described.
The jury found Conner guilty of second degree murder and destruction,
alteration, or concealment of evidence, but was unable to reach a
verdict on the other charges. At sentencing, the district court, based on
a motion by the State, dismissed the grand theft and forgery charges.
The district court entered judgment against Conner and sentenced him
to a unified term of thirty years with eighteen years determinate on the
second degree murder conviction, and imposed a concurrent sentence of
five years determinate on the destruction, alteration, or concealment of
evidence conviction.

Id. p. 503-04 (footnote omitted).
The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Petitioner timely filed a pro se Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction
Relief and requested that counsel be appointed. (R. p. 6-11, 12-14.)

The state filed

an answer. (R. p. 26-28.) The Petitioner signed an Amended Petition for Post-
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Conviction Relief on January 18, 2018 (filed on January 22, 2018), that looks like it
crossed in the mail with the court's Order Appointing Counsel filed on January 18,
2018. (R. p. 29, 35-44.) The state filed another answer. (R. p. 45-48.)
Appointed counsel filed, with the court's permission, the verified Second
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief supported by the Affidavit of Dennis
Benjamin and Affidavit of Petitioner. (R. p. 64- 78, 79-82, 83-85.) Dennis Benjamin
was the attorney who had represented Mr. Conner in his direct appeal. The state
filed an answer. (R. p. 86-90.)
The state then filed a motion for summary dismissal with supporting exhibits.
(R. p. 94-126, 127-187.) Petitioner filed a response brief. (R. p. 188-197.) The state

filed a reply. (R. p. 198-201.) The state also brought a motion to strike the affidavit
of Dennis Benjamin that the court denied at the later hearing. (R. p. 203-207.)
A hearing was held on the state's motion for summary disposition at which the
court took the matter under advisement. (R. p. 210.) The court later dismissed the
petition in its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Respondent's Motion for
Summary Dismissal. (R. p. 212-241.) A separate judgment issued. (R. p. 242-243.)
Appellant timely appeals. (R. p. 244-24 7.)
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ISSUE

WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN SUMMARILY DISMISSING THE
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF BASED ON
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
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ARGUMENT
THE COURT ERRED BY SUMMMARILY DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF BASED ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL

A.

Standard of Review at Trial and on Appeal
An application for post-conviction relief under Idaho Code § 19-4901 is civil in

nature and is an entirely new proceeding distinct from the criminal action which led
to the conviction. Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 494 (Ct.App. 1994). In order to prevail
in a post-conviction proceeding, the applicant must prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based.

Id.
Summary disposition is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment
under I.R.C.P. 56, with the facts construed and all reasonable inferences made in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759
(Ct.App. 1991).

Allegations contained in the verified petition are deemed true for

the purpose of determining whether an evidentiary hearing should be held.

Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844 (Ct.App. 1994).

If the allegations do not frame a

genuine issue of material fact, the court may grant a motion to summarily dismiss,
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but if the application raises material issues of fact, the district court must conduct
an evidentiary hearing. Id.
In determining whether a motion for summary disposition was properly
granted, the appellate court reviews the facts in the light most favorable to
petitioner and determines whether, if true, they would entitle petitioner to relief.

Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319 (1995).
B.

Standard of Review Regarding a

Claim of Ineffective Assistance of

Counsel
The standard for evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is well
established, being set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The
"benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the
trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Id. at 686.

Strickland set forth a two-prong test which a defendant must satisfy in order
to be entitled to relief.

The defendant must demonstrate both that his counsel's

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceedings
would have been different. Id. at 687-88; State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129 (1989);

Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631 (1986).
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C.

The Claims
The district court summarized the claims as trial counsel was ineffective for 1)

failing to make a contemporaneous objection to the expert testimony given by expert
witness Dr. Smock, and 2) for failing to provide Petitioner with the discovery
material he requested. Petitioner further alleged he was denied effective assistance
of counsel "because the cumulative effect of all the above instances of deficient
performance prejudiced him. (R. p. 216-217.)
Appellant is only pursuing here the first claim relating to failing to object to
the testimony of Dr. William Smock, MD. As to him, the state had provided the
report of Dr. Smock, a police Surgeon employed by the city of Louisville, Kentucky.
His report was three and a half pages long including pictures and his attached CV
was 54 pages long. (R. 128-131, 132-186.)
After a hearing in this case, the Court entered the following order pursuant to
IRE 615(2):
1. Witnesses will be excluded from the court room during the trial of

this matter except during the witnesses' own testimony. Witnesses are
prohibited from discussing their testimony or anticipated testimony
with any other witness or prospective witness during the entire course
of the trial.
2. Detective Joe Miller will be allowed to sit at counsel table during the
trial as the designated representative of the State. Detective Miller is to
refrain from appearing in uniform, displaying his badge, weapon, or
other indicia of affiliation with law enforcement.
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3. Counsel are admonished to instruct their witnesses in accordance
with this order.
Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, p. 5. (R. p. 68.)
The Second Amended Petition alleged as follows:
25. During the trial, Dr. Smock was called as a witness by the State on
Friday, April 3, 2015. (T. pg. 1548, ln. 2).
26. Dr. Smock's testimony was critical to the State's theory of the case,
that Mr. Conner struck his father, Otis Conner, in the head with a claw
hammer, killing him, and that Mr. Conner staged the scene to make it
appear that Otis Conner's death was due to an accidental fall from a
ladder.
27. Dr. Smock never personally viewed Otis Conner's body. He stated
that his opinions were based on his assessment of the information
provided, as well as his education, experience, and training over the
last thirty years.
28. He went on to state that he could identify a "pattern injury" on the
back of Otis Conner's head: "when I say pattern injury, that's a term
that I use which means we can match it back with a specific implement
or weapon" (T. pg. 1573, In. 6-9).
29. He testified that the injuries Otis sustained to his head were "a
pattern that I have seen before in the emergency department in living
victims of assault. And it's a pattern injury that is from a-the claw of a
hammer." (T. pg. 1572, ln. 17-20).
30. He went on to testify as to the degree of force used to inflict the
injury. "It tells me there is enough force, one, to split the skin; but two,
to facture the skull" (T p. 1578).
31. He based a portion of his opinion as to the degree of force used to
inflict the injury on the testimony previously given at trial by forensic
pathologist, Dr. Glen Groben.
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32. Dr. Glen Graben, M.D., a forensic pathologist with the Ada County
Coroner's Office performed a body inspection on Otis Conner in the
autopsy suite of the Ada County Coroner's office the day after his death.
(T. pg. 1457, ln. 17-1 8).
33. Dr. Graben eventually concluded that Otis Connor's death was a
homicide. However, his initial conclusion was that the fatal injuries
Otis Conner received were consistent with a fall from a ladder and he
had originally written on the death certificate: "fall from a ladder". (T.
pg. 1458, ln 3-5); (T. pg. 1482, ln. 15-17).
34. Dr. Graben testified at trial regarding his changing conclusions
concerning the manner and cause of Otis' death on Thursday, April 2,
2015, the day before Dr. Smock testified.
35. Regardless, Dr. Smock testified on April 3, 2015, "That's a
significant amount of force. If we-believe the pathologist testified
because of the blood in the right-in one of the ears, that was consistent
with a basilar skull fracture." (T. pg. 1578, ln. 13-17).
36. Dr. Smock went on to testify that "if we have a fracture that is down
at the bottom of the skull from an impact at the top of the skull, what
that tells you is there was so much force applied to the top of the skull
that force went down through the skull and fractured the bottom of the
skull." (T. pg. 1578, ln. 19-24).
37. Dr. Smock concluded that Otis "died of blunt force trauma to the
head. He died of - that is a blow from a claw hammer. That is
consistent with a blow from a single portion of the claw hammer. This
laceration with underlying skull fracture is the result of blunt force
trauma." (T. pg. 1580, ln. 11-16).
38. The statement from Dr. Smock, given during his direct testimony,
concerning Dr. Groben's testimony the day before, should have put Mr.
Conner's counsel on immediate notice that a violation of the Court's
Order Re Exclusion of Witnesses; State's Designation of a
Representative Under I.R.E. 615(2); and Admonishment, entered on
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February 27, 2015, had been violated, and an objection should have
been made at that time.
39. Additionally, Dr. Smock testified on cross examination that he was
not present when Dr. Graben testified the day before, but he learned
what Dr. Groben's testimony entailed from the prosecutor. (T. pg. 1592,
ln. 14-19).
40. Instead of making a contemporaneous objection to Dr. Smock's
testimony on direct, or when the aforementioned contact came to light
on cross examination, counsel waited until the morning of Monday,
April 6, 2015, to notify the Court that they were in the process of
formulating a motion to strike the testimony of Dr. Smock.
42. "We noticed in both the direct examination and in cross examination
that there apparently was some contact between Dr. Smock and a
member of the prosecuting attorney's office. And during that contact,
which was apparently the afternoon before Dr. Smock testified,
somehow Dr. Smock became aware of some portions, at least, of the
testimony that Dr. Graben had given the day before. So we feel that
that's violate of the Court's 615 Order that was entered." (T. pg. 1762,
ln. 11-21).
43. The Court indicated that it appreciated the "heads-up" concerning
the anticipated motion but it didn't intend to hear argument on it at
that time. (T. pg. 1763, ln. 8 - pg. 1 764, ln. 7).
44. Counsel then indicated they believed Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b)(7)
had also been violated during Dr. Smock's testimony as that rule
"requires the State to advise us in advance of trial opinions held by
their expert witnesses and the facts and data that support those
opinions. They are required to advise us of those things upon demand,
and so we did file a demand along those lines in October of 2014. We
thought that they had complied with the discovery rule in that respect
by providing us with the three-page report from Dr. Smock as well as
his resume. But when he got up and testified last Friday, his testimony
went well beyond the opinions contained in his report, and he talked
about a lot of facts and data that were also not described in his report.
And so our motion to strike his testimony is based on two things: Rule
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615 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence and Rule 16(b)(7) of the Idaho
Criminal Rules." (T. pg. 1763, ln. 11-25, T pg. 1764, In. 1-4).
45. The defense filed a Motion to Strike the Testimony of Dr. William
Smock, with supporting documentation on April 6, 2018. (Ct. Rec. on
App., pgs. 1396-1481).
46. The Court heard oral argument on the defense's Motion to Strike
the Testimony of Dr. Smock on Thursday, April 9, 2015. (T. pg. 2203, In.
11- pg. 2234, In. 16).
In denying the Defense Motion to Strike, the Court indicated that "The
problem I have here is I don't know what happened. And the
opportunity to find out what happened left on the airplane with Dr.
Smock. The objections that are raised by the defense may or may not
have merit. They should have been raised when the doctor was here
when they could be dealt with. You don't get the luxury in trial of
waiting three days after testimony to come in and say, Gee whiz, I wish
I had made an objection because this guy testified beyond his
disclosure. That objection needs to be made at the time the witness is
testifying so that it can be cured, if necessary, or prevent it, actually. If
someone raises the objection, this witness is testifying to matters not
within the scope of the report, at that point I can take a look at the
report, I can hear the tendered testimony from the witness, and I can
make an informed decision. I can't make that kind of decision in
retrospect. Trials don't work that way. The objection needed to be raised
when Dr. Smock was on the stand testifying." (T. pg. 2232, In. 6- pg.
2233, In. 2).
47. As noted above, the Court never reached the merits of the
defendant's Motion to Strike the Testimony of Dr. William Smock
because the objection was not made contemporaneous to the testimony.
48. In Mr. Conner's Affidavit in support of this Petition, he indicates
that he witnessed one of his attorneys, Ransom Bailey, physically
prevent his other attorney, Mike Lojek, from standing to object to the
testimony of Dr. Smock during his direct examination, and that he
heard Mr. Bailey tell Mr. Lojek, "you can't do this to me, Judge
Greenwood has Rules". (Petit. Aff., para. 5).
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Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, p. 5-9. (R. p. 68-72.)
D.

The District Court's Ruling
The district court made the following rulings:

i.

Trial Counsel's Failure to Make a Contemporaneous
Objection to the Expert Testimony Given by Dr. Smock

Petitioner Conner argues that trial counsel were ineffective because
they failed to timely object to the testimony of the State's expert, Dr.
Smock. Conner argues this failure fell below an objective standard of
reasonable professional performance. Conner also claims that he was
prejudiced by this deficient performance because, had trial counsel
timely objected, the Court would have stricken Dr. Smock's testimony
from the record, which was a pivotal and critical piece of the State's
evidence. There are two parts to Conner's claim. First, Conner alleges
Dr. Smock was provided in some manner with the contents of the
testimony of Dr. Groben from a day earlier, contrary to the Court's
I.R.E. 615 exclusion order. Second, Conner alleges Dr. Smock testified
to opinions that went beyond those provided in his expert disclosure.
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal
(hereinafter Memorandum Decision), p. 6. (R. p. 217.)

a. The Court's Exclusion Order-1.R.E. 615
Petitioner Conner argues that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to
object to the portion of Dr. Smock's trial testimony where he discusses
another expert witness's conclusions at trial, in violation of the Court's
I.R.E 615 exclusion order, and that he was prejudiced by this deficiency.
The State argues that expert witnesses were not part of the I.R.E 615
exclusion order.

Memorandum Decision, p. 6. (R. p. 217.)
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Appellant will not belabor this portion of the issue because the district court
ruled that the state in fact did violate the exclusion order because there was no
exception for expert witnesses. (R. p. 220.)
For organizational sake Appellant will break from the Memorandum
Decision's order and instead continue with the district court's deficient performance
analysis of this issue:

c. Deficient Performance-the Court's Exclusion Order
Petitioner Conner has shown for the purpose of summary dismissal that
the prosecution provided part of Dr. Groben's trial testimony to Dr.
Smock. By informing Dr. Smock of the testimony of Dr. Groben, the
State violated the Court's exclusion order. In the underlying criminal
case, trial counsel moved to strike the testimony of Dr. Smock. Postconviction relief is sought not because the motion was poorly made or
not the proper motion, but because the motion was untimely. The
motion and supporting memorandum is in the record as part of the
Clerk's record on appeal. The motion requested the Court to "order the
entirety of Dr. Smock's testimony be stricken from the record and that
the jury be given an instruction to not base its decision in any way on
Dr. Smock's testimony." The motion was based on the grounds set out
above. Conner's right to post-conviction relief depends in part on the
merits of the late filed motion.
At trial, Dr. Groben testified that he initially ruled the death an
accident, and then later changed his mind. He testified that the blood
coming from the victim's ear was consistent with a fracture along the
base of the skull. He also testified that he did not believe the skull
fracture was from the claw side of a hammer. Specifically, "Well, I don't
believe that the claw side of that hammer caused a skull fracture. It's
not - it's not consistent with that." Trial Transcript, p. 1498. He did not
use the term "skull fracture" in his report that was available to Dr.
Smock.
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Dr. Smock testified on direct that he learned about Dr. Groben's
testimony from the prosecutor. He gave additional information on cross
examination. On direct examination, Dr. Smock testified that the cause
of death was blunt force trauma resulting from hammer blows to the
head of the victim. Along the way he also testified that there was
evidence of a skull fracture in the pictures of the victim's head; that the
presence of a basilar skull fracture demonstrated that "a tremendous
amount of energy had to be applied to the top of the skull for that
energy to go down and break the bones away from the area of impact";
that the orientation of the injuries was inconsistent with a fall; that the
injury to the victim's left finger as well as the blood on the victim's
hands were consistent with a defensive wound to the finger; that the
amount of blood loss at the scene demonstrated an injury too significant
to be treated at home with a bandage; and that the body was moved but
the victim could not have moved himself based on the lack of bloody
handprints and shoeprints in the area of the body. The testimony upon
which Conner based his petition is set out in the Appendix to this
decision.
By informing Dr. Smock of the testimony of Dr. Groben, the State
violated the Court's exclusion order. The language of the order is plain
and explicit. Contrary to the State's arguments, there is no blanket
exception for expert witnesses under Rule 615. The State did not ask for
an exception for its expert witness either at the pre-trial hearing, on the
order itself, or during trial. The State suggests that the need to be
certain the expert witnesses are basing their testimony on the most
accurate information trumps a court's exclusion order. This argument is
without merit. The State should have either refrained from discussion
of trial evidence with Dr. Smock or sought a modification of the
exclusion order. Alternatively, the State should have supplemented its
expert disclosure under Rule 16(j).
The next issue is what the outcome of a timely motion to strike the
testimony of Dr. Smock based on the violation of the order would have
been. Whether a violation of an exclusion order results in disallowing
the witness to testify is a discretionary call by the trial judge. State v.
Cardell, 132 Idaho 217, 221, 970 P.2d 10, 14 (1998); 14 A.L.R.3d 16
(Originally published in 1967). The appropriate remedy for a breach of
an exclusion order is also committed to the sound discretion of the trial
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court. Id. "In exercising its discretion, the trial court ordinarily should
not exclude witnesses without a demonstration of probable prejudice."
State v. Huntsman, 146 Idaho 580, 589, 199 P.3d 155, 164 (Ct. App.
2008) (internal citations omitted).
Here, so far as identified in the record, Dr. Smock learned from the
prosecutor for the first time on the day of his testimony that Dr. Graben
diagnosed a basilar skull fracture. Conner did not articulate either in
the motion to strike or in his post-conviction petition how he was
prejudiced by disclosure of this additional information to Dr. Smock. It
does not appear that Dr. Smock changed his opinion regarding the
manner and method of the victim's death. The only way this
information was used in his testimony was to say that the basilar skull
fracture showed that an enormous amount of force was involved in the
blow that killed the victim. This is hardly a devastating bit of evidence
and Conner has not suggested how he was either disadvantaged or
surprised by this testimony.
Conner argues that the violation of the exclusion order gave Dr. Smock
the opportunity to reconcile the inconsistency between his testimony
and that of Dr. Graben. The Court disagrees. In fact, some of Dr.
Smock's testimony contradicted Dr. Groben's testimony. Dr. Graben
testified that one of the injuries was not, in his opinion, the result of a
blow from the claw of a hammer, but from a flat surface. Trial counsel
made this point on cross examination. At all times, Dr. Smock opined
that the victim's death was not an accident and that the injuries were
caused by a hammer.
Had the motion been timely made, that bit of testimony would have
been excluded, but not Dr. Smock's entire testimony.
Memorandum Decision, p. 9-12 (some footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). (R. p.
220-223.)
Next, the district court's introduction to the beyond the scope of disclosure
claim was as follows:
b. Beyond the Scope of Disclosure

16

Petitioner Conner argues that trial counsel were deficient when they
failed to timely object to the portions of Dr. Smock's trial testimony that
went beyond the scope of his written disclosure, and that he was
prejudiced by this deficiency. The State argues that its discovery
disclosure was sufficient for the purpose of Rule 16(b)(7) and that Dr.
Smock did not go beyond the scope of his disclosure.

Memorandum Decision, p. 8. (R. p. 219.)
Again, since the district court found that Dr. Smock did testify beyond the
scope of his disclosure, Appellant will simply move on to the deficient performance
analysis.
d. Deficient Performance-Beyond the Scope of Disclosure

Petitioner Conner has shown that Dr. Smock's trial testimony went
beyond the scope of his written disclosures.
In the underlying criminal proceeding, trial counsel requested:
(8) [A] written summary or report of any testimony that the state
intends to introduce pursuant to rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Idaho
Rules of Evidence at trial or hearing; including the witnesses' opinions,
the facts and data for those opinions, and the witnesses' qualifications.
Dr. Smock's written report was three pages in total. The first page
consisted of Dr. Smock's recitation of what he reviewed to form his
opinion as well as what he believed to be the series of events that led up
to the incident. The second page consisted of a photo of the victim's
shaven scalp with three wounds marked with numbers and Dr. Smock's
description of the three wounds. The third page consisted of a zoomedin photo of one of the wounds and Dr. Smock's ultimate opinions:
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1. Mr. Otis Conner sustained multiple blunt force impacts to the

posterior and superior surfaces of his scalp on January 2nd,
2013, which resulted in his death.
2. Mr. Otis Conner sustained at least one pattern laceration from
blunt force trauma to the superior scalp. The pattern laceration
(#2) is the result of a blow from the claw portion of a hammer.
The linear laceration (#3) is consistent with a blow from one side
of the claw portion of a hammer.
3. The death scene displays evidence of post-mortem tampering
including movement of Mr. Otis Conner's body.
4. The forensic evidence and traumatic injuries associated with
the death of Mr. Otis Conner are the result of an assault and are
not consistent with a fall from a ladder.
Conner focuses on five opinions that he believes exceeded the scope of
Dr. Smock's written disclosures: (1) the victim had an additional injury
underneath some hair; (2) the perpendicular nature of two of the
wounds; (3) a photo of the victim's hand, which shows a laceration on
the victim's finger; (4) the amount of blood found at the crime scene;
and (5) the movement of the victim's body, indicating a staged scene.
First, Conner complained of Dr. Smock's testimony where he discussed
a "superficial abraded area.".5.
Q: [From the prosecuting attorney] I want to ask you about something
else that we see here on the head ....

A: That wavy area right there?
Q: And what does that mean to you?

A: That says that there is another area of blunt force trauma. It looks
like a superficial abraded area possibly a superficial laceration.
The State argues that this testimony was not outside Dr. Smock's
report because a picture of the victim's head was included in the report

18

and the "superficial abraded area" is "plainly visible" from the photo.
When looking at the photo, there is no "plainly visible" additional
wound, which "anyone who looked at it closely" could see. Dr. Smock
explained in his written report that he would be discussing three
specific head wounds. The "superficial abraded area" was not one of
those. This observation should have been included in Dr. Smock's
report. Had the motion been timely made, the Court would have
excluded it.
Second, Conner complained of Dr. Smock's testimony where he
discussed the perpendicular nature of the two wounds ..fi
Q: [From the prosecuting attorney] Is there anything about the
orientation of these injuries that's inconsistent with a fall?

A: Yeah, we have these are oriented this direction. And what's
interesting is this one, this pattern injury is parallel with this. This
is oriented ninety degrees opposite.
Q: And why is that significant?

A: This tells me that these mJuries were sustained from one
orientation and this from another. Now whether that's the head is
oriented differently or the blow came from a different direction, this
way one and this way in another.

Q: And is that difference in orientation relevant to why it's not a fall
from a ladder?
A: Yes sir ....
The State argues that this testimony was not outside Dr. Smock's
report because the photo of the victim's head was included in the report
and the perpendicular nature of the wounds can be seen from that
photo. Moreover, Dr. Smock's written opinion contained in his report
stated, "The forensic evidence and traumatic injuries associated with
the death of Mr. Otis Conner are the result of an assault and are not
consistent with a fall from a ladder." Dr. Smock did not go outside the
scope of his report when he mentioned the perpendicular nature of the
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two wounds. The photo was contained in Dr. Smock's report and the
perpendicular nature can be seen from the photo. This is forensic
evidence within the disclosure. Had the motion gone forward on the
merits at trial, this portion would have been overruled.
Third, Conner complained of Dr. Smock's testimony where he discussed
the victim's finger laceration. The State argues that this testimony was
not outside Dr. Smock's report because Conner was provided with a
photo of Dr. Groben's body inspection in discovery and the finger
laceration can be seen in that photo. The State is incorrect. Not only
was the photo of the hand not contained in Dr. Smock's report, but
there was no discussion or opinion about the victim's hand in the
report. It may be that this is part of the forensic evidence to which Dr.
Smock refers in his report, but the testimony regarding the significance
of the wound and the opinion that they reflect defensive wounds was
not. In his disclosure, Dr. Smock discussed only the head wounds; he
makes no reference to the finger wound. This testimony was beyond the
scope of the disclosure. Had the motion been timely made at trial, the
evidence would have been excluded.
Fourth, Conner complained of Dr. Smock's testimony about the amount
of blood in the house. The State argues that this testimony was not
outside Dr. Smock's report because Dr. Smock concluded in his report
that "the forensic evidence ... associated with the death of Mr. Otis
Conner are the result of an assault and are not consistent with a fall
from a ladder." The blood in the house constitutes forensic evidence.
This evidence supports Dr. Smock's opinion that "the death scene
displays evidence of post-mortem tampering including movement of Mr.
Otis Conner's body." While Dr. Smock's testimony regarding the
amount of blood in the house could be taken to refute the notion that
the blood in the house could not have come from a superficial wound,
such as the injury to the finger, or by inference, a bite from the dog, this
was not raised as a ground for the objection. The objection was that the
undisclosed opinion allowed the expert to conform his opinion to that of
the expert who testified ahead of him. That argument is rejected. Had
the motion been timely made at trial, Dr. Smock's testimony would not
have been excluded on this ground.

20

Finally, Conner complained of Dr. Smock's testimony about the scene of
the crime and how he believed it was staged and/or the victim did not
move himself to his ultimate resting position._8
8 Q: [From the prosecuting attorney] Do you believe that based
on what you've seen that Otis Conner could've moved himself?
A: Absolutely not.

Q: Do you believe that there's anything about what you saw in
the garage consistent with a scene being staged?

A: Yes sir.
Q: And what is that?

A: And the reason is someone who is deceased can't create this
movement. As we approach any scene, what is the physical
evidence? And the physical evidence shows somebody with
significant amount of blood loss with movement. Multiple -we've
got movement here, we've got some movement here, we've got
movement here, we've got some movement here. If this were
someone who were alive and doing this, where are the - there are
no bloody shoe prints, there's no bloody hand prints that show
somebody was trying to move. This is what you see when
somebody else moves a body.
Dr. Smock did not go outside his written report for this opinion. Dr.
Smock's report specifically states, "The death scene displays evidence of
post-mortem tampering including movement of Mr. Conner's body." It
could hardly be a surprise that the witness would be called upon at trial
to elaborate on the evidence that led to this conclusion in the report.
Memorandum Decision, p. 12-16 (emphasis added, some footnotes omitted).
(R. p. 223-227.)
Finally, the court discussed prejudice.
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e. Prejudice-Dr. Smock's Testimony

As discussed above, to obtain post-conviction relief based on ineffective
assistance of counsel, the petitioner must overcome two hurdles. First,
there must be a showing of substandard performance by counsel. Idaho
appellate courts have consistently "adhered to the proposition that
tactical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed
on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation,
ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective
evaluation." Caldwell, 159 Idaho at 240, 358 P.3d at 801 (citing Howard
v. State. 126 Idaho 231, 233, 880 P.2d 261, 263 (Ct. App. 1994)).
Conner argues there is no possible strategic or tactical purpose that
justifies counsel's decision to delay making the motion to strike Dr.
Smock's testimony. What justification might be proffered by trial
counsel is unknown; they have yet to be heard from. At this stage, there
is at least sufficient question raised so as to require denying the State's
Motion for Summary Dismissal on the first part of the Strickland test.
Consequently, the Court proceeds to the second part of the Strickland
test on the assumption that counsel's performance was deficient.
The next question is whether Conner was prejudiced. That is, is there a
"[r]easonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient
performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different."
Caldwell, 159 Idaho at 239, 358 P.3d at 800 (citing Aragon, 114 Idaho
at 760, 760 P.2d at 1176). As set out above, depending on the facts that
come out at trial of this case regarding trial counsels' tactical reasons
for their decision to delay making the motion, a timely motion would
have been granted in part and denied in part._9_
9 If the trial of the pending case shows there was a valid, albeit
unsuccessful, strategic or tactical reason for the delay in making
the motion, then there is not deficient performance by counsel
and Part 2 of Strickland is not reached.
The following testimony would have been excluded:
1. Dr. Smock's testimony that the enormity of the force of the blow was

demonstrated by the existence of the basilar skull fracture;
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2. Dr. Smock's testimony regarding the injury to the victim's finger, and
his opinion that the head wounds together with the finger wound reflect
defensive wounds.
Conner argues that he was prejudiced because Dr. Smock was a pivotal
and critical witness for the State. He shored up the testimony of Dr.
Groben and he helped form a forensic bridge between Dr. Groben's
testimony and Dr. Bevel's testimony. The Court disagrees. The State
has explained in detail the testimony of the other two experts, Dr. Bevel
and Dr. Groben. That discussion will not be repeated here. The
testimony of Dr. Smock may have been a bridge, but the excluded
testimony is not the deck or girders of the bridge. The evidence does not
support the argument that Dr. Smock altered his testimony to conform
to Dr. Groben's opinion. In fact, some of Dr. Smock's testimony
contradicted Dr. Groben's testimony.
The Court has reviewed the evidence in this case.10
10 The Court had the benefit of the trial transcript from the
record on appeal. The Court reviewed the exhibit list, but not the
exhibits themselves.
Even with the absence of the testimony that should have been excluded,
the Court is convinced the outcome of the trial would have been the
same. A defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect trial. Conner
has not shown there is a reasonable probability that "but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different." Matthews v. State, 130 Idaho 39, 43, 936 P.2d 682, 685 (Ct.
App. 1997).
Memorandum Decision, p. 16-18. (R. p. 227-229.)

E.

The court erred in dismissing the claim
First of all, the district court leaves out its ruling that it would have excluded

the testimony regarding the "superficial abraded area" in its prejudice analysis when
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it describes the two, instead of three, areas of testimony it would have excluded.
Regardless, the real problem is that the district court undervalued Dr. Smock's
testimony.

The court simply excised the few things it stated it would have struck

from Dr. Smock's testimony and held it wouldn't have changed the outcome.
While the court recognizes that the defense had moved to strike Dr. Smock's
testimony in its entirety, it never addresses why. But what really happened is that
the defense basically argued a bad faith violation of the rule of exclusion of witnesses
on the part of the state undertaken in order to remedy inconsistencies between the
testimony between the state's prior expert witnesses which led to the new opinions
by Dr. Smock which were outside the scope of his disclosure.
As an initial matter, the district court makes inconsistent statements about
taking judicial notice of the record of the criminal case. Petitioner's counsel attached
discs of the clerk's record and transcripts from the direct appeal to the second
amended petition. (R. p. 66.)

However, at the hearing on the state's motion for

summary disposition, the district court stated that it was not going to take judicial
notice of the entire appellate record because there is something in excess of 2,000
pages. 1 (Tr. 46924, p. 6.)

1

The clerk's record alone is 1688 pages without exhibits, sealed filings, grand jury
transcript or PSI. The transcripts comprise 2,909 pages.
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The court stated it would only take judicial notice of the portions of the
appellate record that are specifically referred to in the briefs. (Tr. p. 6.) The court
stated that if it feels it needs to look at additional portions of the record that are not
specifically referred to in the briefs it will advise in the decision. (Id. p. 7 .)
The court did so, because in its Memorandum Decision the district court states
"[t]he Court has reviewed the evidence in this case."10. That footnote provides"[t]he
Court had the benefit of the trial transcript from the record on appeal. The Court
reviewed the exhibit list, but not the exhibits themselves." (Memorandum Decision,
p. 18, n. 10, R. 229.)
Since the district court had the benefit of the trial transcript then this Court
certainly should as well. The district court undertook a prejudice analysis which
considered whether there would be sufficient evidence after the motion to strike was
granted in part. This of course considers the trial evidence, which the district court
expressly stated it reviewed. The district court was not any more specific, so
accordingly, Appellant has contemporaneously herewith filed a motion to take
judicial notice of the entire criminal trial transcript.
The trial transcript puts the motion to strike in context which the
Memorandum Decision does not. That context was explained by the defense in oral
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argument on the motion to strike when it was eventually taken up. 2 First, the blood
spatter expert, Tom Bevel, testified, and the next day, the Ada County Corner, Dr.
Glen Groben, testified that in his opinion a stellate wound was not caused by a
hammer. He also testified about a skull fracture on the lower portion of the skull.
(Trial Tr. p. 2206.) The problem was that Dr. Groben's testimony conflicted in some
significant ways with Tom Bevel's testimony and it was a problem for the state that
their experts were not agreeing on fundamental things, such as the number of
wounds or whether they were caused by a hammer. (Trial Tr. p. 2206-2207.)
Then, Dr. Smock arrived and someone from the prosecuting attorney's office
told him some of the things Dr. Groben had testified to. (Trial Tr. p. 2207.) This
allowed Dr. Smock to shape his testimony to conform to and/or rebut certain things
that Dr. Groben testified to and the state apparently coached Dr. Smock on how to
do this. (Trial Tr. p. 2208.) This is the very thing that Rule 615 orders are designed
to prevent. (Trial Tr. p. 2209.)

According to the defense, that happened here

because Dr. Smock testified to things for the first time including a skull fracture, his
apparent ability to see bone chips in the picture and the laceration on the left finger
being a defensive wound. (Trial Tr. p. 2209.) The defense continued by arguing that
we know this is in response to what the state told him because those things were not

2

This section of the trial transcript was cited in the post-conviction and so the
district court specifically took judicial notice of it.
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in his report. (Trial Tr. p. 2210.) And so the prosecution's conversation with him
gave Dr. Smock an opportunity to shape his testimony in those respects to that of Dr.
Graben and/or Tom Bevel and/or to rebut the same. (Trial Tr. p. 2210.) So it appears
Dr. Smock was coached on the problem created by the inconsistency of the
prosecution's two expert witnesses and his testimony was shaped in such a way to at
least attempt to fix that problem. (Trial Tr. p. 2210-2211.)

This violated the 615

order, but also his testimony was outside the scope of I.C.R. 16(b)(7) because once
the state had the additional conversation with Dr. Smock he added opinions that he
was testifying about that were not in his report. (Trial Tr. p. 2211-2212.)
Of course, the court did not reach the issue because any objections to the scope
of disclosure were waived by allowing the witness to testify as were any objections to
whatever conversation occurred between the prosecution and the witness. (Trial Tr.
p. 2234.)

To further put the importance of Dr. Smock's testimony in context is the
following exchange between him and the prosecutor when he was asked about
reviewing reports:

Q. And so at the time that you wrote your report and previous to
coming into court today, are you aware that some of the first
responders initially thought this might be a fall from a ladder?
A. Yes, sir.
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Q. Are you aware that the forensic pathologist, Dr. Groben, initially
thought that this could be a fall from a ladder?
A .Yes, sir.

Q. And that he ultimately changed his opinion to homicide?
A. Yes, sir.
Trial Tr. p. 1569, In. 18-p. 1570, In. 5.
The prosecutor actually gives this point short shrift because he says some of
the first responders. The defense closing sufficiently summarizes the uncontroversial
evidence on this point. It was not some first responders, it was everyone. And there
were six. There were three firefighters/paramedics, two police officers, and the
coroner's office death investigator. (Trial Tr. p. 2808-2809.) They all saw the scene
in person and saw the body in person and talked to and observed Mr. Conner and
everyone agreed that this was an accidental fall. (Trial Tr. p. 2808-2809.)
With permission, the firefighters/paramedics actually went into the house and
gathered cleaning products and went into the garage and helped clean up the scene
and afterward put things back in the house. (Trial Tr. 2804). They noticed nothing
unusual inside the house. (Id.)

One of the two police officers went into the house

just to make sure that everything seemed normal, and it did. (Trial Tr. p. 2805.) The
other police officer was taking the pictures, which is what everyone who wasn't at
the scene based their opinions on (as well as the corner's pictures). (Trial Tr. p.
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2805.) Defense counsel pointed out there was no picture of how the scene looked
when the firefighters arrived and before they altered things by moving the ladder off
of Otis and tending to his body. (Trial Tr. p. 2805-2806.)
Then the next day Dr. Groben, based on the pictures of the scene and his
external body examination of Otis, but without an autopsy, concluded that Otis had
fallen off the ladder, gotten up, stumbled over and fell on the stairs and hit his head
again and that the manner of death was accident. (Trial Tr. p. 2812.) Dr. Groben
went so far as to actually lay down on some stairs in his office to ensure he could
replicate that the injury could happen by falling on stairs. (Trial Tr. p. 2811-2812.)
Then, Dr. Groben decided to release the body to the Conner family and it was
cremated as Otis had arranged. (Trial Tr. p. 2813.)
Again, the district court did not consider the bad faith of the state. This is not
a matter where the court should simply excise discrete portions of Dr. Smock's
testimony. Rather, contrary to the continued insistence of the state, there was
simply no exception to the order of exclusion of witnesses which would allow Dr.
Smock to learn of the testimony of other witnesses and the state cannot seriously
argue that there was one. Nor could the state seriously argue that the areas that the
district court ruled were not in Dr. Smock's disclosure were in his disclosure.
Likewise the thing that was not visible in the picture was not clearly visible in the
picture.
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Rather, as the defense argued, the state told Dr. Smock about Dr. Groben's
testimony to elicit new and additional testimony to rectify whatever problems the
state perceived it had. This is exactly what the 615 order was designed to prevent
and excluding Dr. Smock's testimony in its entirety is the correct remedy.
Then, contrary to the district court's finding, there was not enough evidence
for the same result without Dr. Smock. Dr. Smock validates the opinions of Tom
Bevel that are inconsistent with Dr Groben. Then Dr. Smock validates the opinions
of Dr. Groben which are consistent with his own. Without Dr. Smock, what we have
is a blood spatter expert testifying far outside of his expertise as to medical matters
which contradicts the medical testimony of the coroner, who himself has flipflopped
in this case. And all of this is contrary to every person who was at the scene who
believed that Otis fell off the ladder.

It must be remembered that the jury did not convict Mr. Conner as charged, it
convicted him only of second degree murder. Furthermore, it failed to reach a verdict
on grand theft and forgery, which significantly, was the state's theory of Mr.
Conner's motive.
Accordingly, the district court erred when it held that Mr. Conner was not
prejudiced and summarily dismissed the petition.
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CONCLUSION
Wherefore, for the reasons above stated, Appellant respectfully requests the
district court's order summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief be
reversed and remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing.
DATED this 19 day of September, 2019.
/s/ Greg S. Silvey
Greg S. Silvey
Attorney for Appellant
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